Our course
readings have ended with Kenneth Burke but his contributions to rhetoric
constitute a new beginning for the field. Burke contributes not a
reformulation, dismissal, or alteration to the classical canons, which the
majority of our theorists have concerned themselves with, but an entirely
original theory which answers the basic questions of the discipline in a new
way. In many ways, ending with Burke returns us to the questions that we first
posed when we read the Dissoi Logoi
at the beginning of the semester, where we considered not just what rhetoric is
“man” as a category and its relationship to language.
The Dissoi Logoi begins with the observation that what is good for one
person may be bad for another, that what one calls “seemly” another calls “shameful”
(B/H 49). Burke begins with this same observation: that the words we use for
values are as ambiguous as the values themselves, and that people build entire
systems of words and ideologies out of ambiguous value judgments. In the same
vein, the Dissoi Logoi does not fight
the ambiguity of language, but notes that we make meaning out of it, so much
that “the same statement is false when the false is present to it, and true
when the true is present to it” (52). Similarly, Burke does not consider
ambiguity one of the problems of language, as Aristotle, Locke, Bacon, and most
of the theorists we have considered do, but finds in the ambiguity of language
fist observations of his theory. In a way, then, we ended with Burke’s “terministic
screens,” but we also began with it.
Positioning Burke at the end of the
syllabus, then, makes sense because it returns us to the questions and the
texts that started our semester. In terms of historiography, returning to these
questions helps us to think of the history of the discipline in non-linear
terms, even disrupting the idea of a “beginning” or an “end.” It also helps us
to view the development of the field as dynamic and developing, especially when
we consider how much Burke departs from the other theorists we have considered.
Our positioning of Burke could be criticized on some of these
same grounds, though. In a course which has dealt so much with theorists that
have more or less agreed about whether ambiguity in language is a problem,
Burke could seem tacked on, especially at the end. Given that the semester is
almost over, we do not have time to consider for more than a couple of hours
the questions that he raises, his contributions, and the different perspective
on basic questions of language that he brings to the field. We pose these
questions only to run out of time to discuss them.
I think the course was ultimately well-served, though, by the
way Burke has been positioned. I think this was helped by beginning the course
with the Dissoi Logoi, because I
think it helps us to think of Burke as both an end and a return to the
beginning of the course. And in returning to these questions with the knowledge
of what we have done, our own reflection on how we have developed as historians
of rhetoric is made richer.